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Introduction
The Bank’s operations in the sterling money markets serve its
core purposes:  to ensure monetary stability and to contribute
to financial stability.  Some of these operations are designed
primarily to implement the Monetary Policy Committee’s
(MPC’s) decisions on the stance of monetary policy.  Others
are designed mainly to provide a liquidity backstop for the
banking system.  They are brought together under the Bank’s
operating framework — the sterling monetary framework
(SMF) — which provides a transparent set of principles
governing these operations.
A central bank’s operating framework consists of a number of
elements, including:  policies on access rights to central bank
facilities;  collateral policies;  and an operating system.  In
different countries these elements are combined in different
ways to give rise to a variety of operating frameworks.
Moreover, operating frameworks continually evolve over time.
This evolution can at times be rapid.  During the recent
financial crisis, central banks, including the Bank of England,
adapted to the needs of exceptional circumstances.  This
period also emphasised the need to have an operating
framework capable of both implementing monetary policy and
fostering financial stability. 
This article explains why the Bank is minded, in due course, to
reinstate substantively those elements of the SMF that were
suspended in March 2009 following the MPC’s decision to
embark on a programme of asset purchases (known as
quantitative easing).(2) In order to explain that decision, the
first section of this article describes the crucial role of reserves
balances that banks hold at the central bank.  The second
section discusses how the central bank can use the terms on
which it supplies these reserves to support the achievement of
its monetary and financial stability objectives.  The third
section then describes the key characteristics of three
commonly discussed systems through which the central bank
supplies reserves.  The fourth section discusses the implications
of these three systems for the interbank money market.  The
final sections explain the principles underpinning the choices
that the Bank has made about its own operating framework
and, given those principles, how its thinking about the design
of its operating framework has been influenced during the
financial crisis.
The role of reserves balances
Reserves are overnight balances that banks hold in an account
at the central bank.  As such, they are a claim on the central
bank.  Together with banknotes, reserves are the most liquid,
risk-free asset in the economy.  And they are the ultimate asset
for settling payments;  banking transactions between
customers of different banks are either directly or indirectly
settled through transfers between reserves accounts at the
central bank.  
Reserves also help banks to manage their liquidity risks, which
arise as a natural result of banking activities.  Banks transform
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deposits, many of which may be withdrawn at short notice,
into loans that are typically contractually committed for
longer periods.  This maturity mismatch exposes banks to
liquidity risk — the risk that they cannot realise assets quickly
enough to pay back deposits — or, if they were forced to
realise assets quickly, to the risk that they could do so only at
distressed prices thereby damaging their value.  Banks can 
self-insure by holding a buffer of liquid assets that can be
easily realised.  As the most liquid asset of all, reserves often
form a key component of such a buffer.  
Factors affecting the aggregate demand for reserves 
The demand for reserves can shift for a number of reasons.
Over time it is likely to grow as the economy and payment
flows expand.  But, as recent events have shown, there can
also be more abrupt changes.  During stressed times, the
interbank market may not work effectively and a bank that is
short of reserves may find it more difficult than usual to
borrow reserves from another bank in the market.  Observing
such difficulties, other banks may respond by increasing their
desired buffers of reserves in case they are faced with
unexpected future payment demands.  For the banking system
as a whole, this would be reflected in a greater aggregate
demand for reserves.
Supply of reserves
Only central banks can alter the supply of reserves.  Their
operating framework defines the terms on which, and the
process by which, this is normally done.  It also provides
central banks with a mechanism for achieving their policy
objectives.  The next section describes the objectives the
central bank typically seeks to achieve in its operations.
Objectives of operating frameworks
The specific objectives of central banks’ operating frameworks
differ from one central bank to another.  But typically, central
bank objectives involve implementing monetary policy and
supporting financial stability.  The financial crisis has
highlighted that the design of a central bank’s operating
framework plays a key role in how these two objectives can be
met.
Monetary policy implementation
Central banks usually communicate the desired stance of
monetary policy by setting a short-term interest rate — the
‘policy rate’.  Their operations in money markets are typically
conducted with the objective that the interest rates at which
banks transact for short periods of time are close to this policy
rate.  To achieve that, central banks need to keep the supply of
reserves in line with changes in the banking system’s aggregate
demand, so that there is neither a shortage nor a surplus of
reserves.  Otherwise, in the event of an increase in the demand
for reserves, market interest rates would tend to rise relative to
the policy rate as banks bid rates up in their efforts to secure
scarce reserves.  The opposite would occur following a fall in
the demand for reserves.
Provision of liquidity insurance
Central banks’ responsibilities with respect to financial stability
mean that they usually provide some degree of liquidity
insurance to individual banks and to the banking system as a
whole.  An adverse liquidity shock could impair banks’ ability
to provide payment services to their customers or to
undertake new lending.  Central banks can mitigate the impact
of liquidity shocks to individual banks by offering to lend
reserves bilaterally.  And they can mitigate the effects of
liquidity shocks to the banking system by allowing the
aggregate supply of reserves to increase and/or by easing the
terms at which reserves are supplied.
A key challenge for central banks is that, although they can
observe changes in banks’ demand for reserves, they are
usually not able to identify with certainty why demand has
changed.  For example, the central bank rarely knows whether
an increase in demand for reserves reflects a temporary
liquidity problem or a more fundamental problem that casts
doubt on the solvency and viability of the borrowing bank.
More generally, the availability of liquidity insurance could
induce risky behaviour, with adverse consequences for future
financial stability.  This ‘moral hazard’ is discussed further in
the box on page 294.
Other objectives
Central banks can effectively fulfil their objectives only if their
own creditworthiness is unquestioned.  So central banks place
considerable weight on ensuring that their financial operations
with banks do not endanger their own solvency.  For this
reason most central banks choose to transact on conservative
terms.  This means that they would usually prefer to lend
reserves secured against only high-quality collateral that they
could sell if the borrowing bank were to default.  And, to
ensure that the collateral would be sufficient to cover the loan
under most circumstances, they would usually lend less than
100% of the value of the collateral — ie impose a ‘haircut’.
Central banks are likely to consider other criteria when
designing their operating framework.  For example, central
banks generally prefer frameworks that are operationally
simple and transparent.  And they favour frameworks that
promote competitive and fair money markets to facilitate the
efficient provision of payment services to the wider economy.
Interactions between monetary policy and financial
stability objectives
A central bank’s operational monetary policy objective is
usually unambiguous:  the closer market interest rates are to
the policy rate, the more reliably monetary policy is
implemented.  And the more the supply of reserves adjusts
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this objective will be met.  By contrast, there is an inherent
tension in how a central bank’s financial stability objective can
best be met.  The more the supply of reserves adjusts
automatically to accommodate changes in demand, the more
seamlessly liquidity insurance is provided.  But this makes it
more likely, other things being equal, that the banking sector
will pursue riskier activities to the detriment of future financial
stability.  In other words, fully accommodating changes in the
demand for reserves is often the best way to implement
monetary policy but not necessarily best, in the long run, for
financial stability.  In principle, there could thus be a tension
between the central bank’s monetary policy and financial
stability objectives that needs to be managed.
There are a number of complementary tools that can help
manage this potential tension.  In particular, the regulatory
framework limits the risks individual banks take.  But the
design of central banks’ operating frameworks will also have an
influence.  Before describing how the Bank pursues its
objectives through the design of its operating framework, it is
important to understand the key characteristics of different
approaches.  The next section sets out three alternative
operating systems, each of which would enable the central
bank to supply reserves so as to keep market interest rates
close to the policy rate.
Alternative operating systems
Most central banks alter the supply of reserves through market
transactions known as open market operations (OMOs) and/or
standing facilities. 
￿ OMOs are designed as multilateral transactions in which
the central bank, at its own initiative, deals in the market,
affecting the banking system as a whole.  If it buys assets or
makes loans, it puts reserves into the banks’ accounts held
at the central bank.  If it sells assets or borrows in the
market, these transactions are settled by reducing the
banks’ reserves accounts.  
￿ Standing facilities are designed to facilitate bilateral
transactions in which a bank at its own initiative deals with
the central bank.  Lending facilities allow banks to borrow
reserves directly from the central bank, potentially in very
Liquidity insurance and moral hazard
Central banks typically provide liquidity insurance to the
banking system.  When designing their liquidity insurance
facilities, central banks — like any insurance provider — have
concerns over ‘moral hazard’.
Moral hazard in this context refers to the risk that the
availability of liquidity insurance induces banks to take on
more risk than they otherwise would.  A simple incentive arises
because liquid assets such as reserves yield less than illiquid
long-term loans and hence self-insurance is costly.
Given that central banks can create reserves at effectively zero
cost to themselves, it could be argued that it does not matter
if banks take on more liquidity risk.  That line of reasoning fails
to take account, however, of the intimate relationship between
banks’ liquidity risk and their solvency.  For example, one way
that an insured bank could increase its liquidity risk would be
by making longer-term loans than it otherwise would.  But
that would probably also increase its solvency risk, given that
pay-offs from its loan book would become more uncertain. 
Central banks have a number of options for limiting this 
moral hazard.  One response that all central banks seek to
implement is to lend only to institutions that it judges to be
solvent.  In principle, this threat of not being able to access
central banks’ liquidity facilities should reduce the liquidity risk
(and the associated solvency risk) banks are willing to
shoulder.  
It can, however, be difficult to distinguish between liquidity
and solvency problems in practice.  So central banks also make
liquidity insurance costly to access.  In principle, they can do
this by charging higher interest rates for high usage of liquidity
facilities or for accepting lower-quality collateral.
Alternatively, they can increase the size of the haircuts on
collateral imposed beyond those that would be strictly
necessary to guard against credit risk.
Central banks are unlikely to have sufficient information to
manage moral hazard effectively through haircuts alone.  They
can set haircuts based on an analysis of the characteristics of
the assets pledged as collateral (for example, an assessment of
how the value of an asset might change in different scenarios)
to help manage credit risk.(1) But setting haircuts to manage
moral hazard would also require an analysis of the balance
sheet and possible future behaviour of the bank pledging the
asset.
Charging a premium over the policy rate for high usage of
liquidity facilities or for lending against lower-quality collateral
is likely to be a more effective way to reduce moral hazard.
However, to the extent that, in some conditions, these interest
rates could influence market interest rates, the central bank
may induce unwanted changes in the monetary policy stance.
The liquidity insurance framework therefore needs to be
carefully designed and implemented to strike the appropriate
balance between these different considerations.
(1) See Breeden and Whisker (2010) for a description of collateral risk management at
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large amounts.  Deposit facilities allow banks to deposit
reserves in interest-bearing accounts at the central bank.  
Central banks also need to specify the circumstances in which
banks can access the facilities that they offer and the range of
eligible collateral, and associated haircuts, that can be pledged
with the central bank in return for borrowed reserves.
In principle many different operating systems could be
constructed from the basic elements, but they can broadly be
grouped into three types.  A number of central banks in
countries with developed financial systems have adopted
variants of the so-called ‘corridor system’.  More recently some
have adopted what has become known as a ‘floor system’.
And, finally, there is the so-called ‘zero-corridor’ system that
has been proposed as a simpler alternative.(1)
The choices of operating system, access rules and collateral
policies jointly determine how monetary policy is
implemented and how liquidity insurance is provided, as well
as how any potential tensions between those activities are
managed.  The remainder of this section describes in generic
terms how these three operating systems can be used to
implement monetary policy, and the particular challenges
associated with their use.
A corridor system
The corridor system derives its name from the interest rates on
the central bank’s standing facilities.  The lending rate will be
above, and the deposit rate will be below, the policy rate,
forming a corridor around it.  As discussed in the box on 
page 296, the specific design of the corridor system — in
particular, whether banks are required to hold reserves or do so
voluntarily — differs from central bank to central bank.  
Banks will typically be unwilling to deal in the market on worse
terms than those available at the central bank.  Consequently,
the short-term market rate is unlikely to fall below the central
bank’s deposit facility rate or to rise above the lending facility
rate, thus helping to keep market rates close to the policy rate.
But the presence of an interest rate floor from the deposit
facility and a ceiling from the lending facility also influences
market rates within the corridor.  Banks are generally uncertain
about the impact that their customers’ future payment flows
will have on their reserves position.  On the one hand, if they
think they are likely to be short of reserves, then they will be
willing to pay more in the market to reduce the risk of having
to use the lending facility at a penal rate.  On the other hand,
market rates will be relatively low if banks think they face
holding excess reserves and receiving a lower return in the
deposit facility.  The resulting demand for reserves is illustrated
in the green line in Chart 1.(2)
To implement monetary policy the central bank has to forecast
the amount of reserves it needs to supply to meet banks’
aggregate demand at the point where the market rate and
policy rate coincide.(3) Consequently, the central bank’s task is
easier in corridor systems where banks’ demand for reserves is
determined through mandated reserve requirements or
reflected in formal targets, than in corridor systems with no
specified targets.  Inaccurate forecasts by the central bank
and/or changes in the demand for reserves that leave banks
with insufficient or surplus reserves will tend to lead to
deviations of market rates from the policy rate.  Whether or
not such deviations have a material impact on the stance of
monetary policy will depend on the amplitude and persistence
of shocks, as well as the precise design of the system.  The box
on page 296 explains how corridor systems can be designed to
minimise such deviations.  
Under the corridor system, the central bank adjusts the
aggregate amount of reserves by undertaking OMOs.  The 
on-demand standing facilities then help to keep market
interest rates close to the policy rate.
The corridor system relies on a functioning interbank money
market to distribute reserves across the banking system.  This
poses a challenge if — as during the recent financial crisis —
banks become reluctant to lend to each other.  To provide
liquidity insurance in the face of such a shock, while
maintaining interest rate control, the central bank could try to
bypass the interbank money market.  It could do this by
offering both to supply and to absorb a large amount of
reserves in its OMOs.  Narrowing the width of its interest rate
corridor would have a similar effect, as it would lower banks’
costs of dealing directly with the central bank relative to
dealing in the interbank money market.  
Reserves target






Chart 1 Stylised demand for reserves in the corridor
system(a)
(a) The shape of the demand curve will differ depending on the specification of the corridor
system.  This is discussed further in the box on page 296. 
(1) See, for example, Buiter (2008) and Wiseman (2007).
(2) See, for example, Keister et al (2008) for a more detailed description.  
(3) In so doing, the central bank must also account for other factors that affect the supply
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A floor system
The ‘floor system’ can be thought of as a variant of the
corridor system where backstop liquidity insurance is still
provided at a penal rate, but where the deposit rate that
provides a floor to interbank money market rates has been
raised to the level of the policy rate.
Under the floor system, the central bank deliberately supplies
reserves in excess of the level banks would voluntarily target.
In aggregate, the banking system has to hold all the reserves
the central bank creates.  Individual banks might try to lend
their surplus reserves to other banks, but would not do so at a
lower interest rate than could be obtained at the central bank.
In this way, the floor system drives market interest rates down
to, but not below, the policy rate.  It has obvious attractions if
a central bank wishes to inject additional money into the
system without losing control of its target interest rate.
The floor system negates the need to regularly forecast the
demand for reserves accurately since reserves are oversupplied
with an interest rate floor at the policy rate.  With the banking
system oversupplied with reserves, it also relies less on the
interbank market to distribute them through the banking
system. 
Oversupply of reserves may, however, create its own
challenges as banks find themselves with a higher ratio of
liquid to total assets than they would choose.  Whether and
how banks respond to this disequilibrium in their balance 
sheet will depend on a number of factors and may not be
easily predictable in advance.  If the additional liquidity allows
banks to extend profitable loans, then they might return
towards their desired ratio by increasing lending.  A floor
system thus has the potential to impact on monetary
conditions in ways that extend beyond influencing short-term
market rates.  
A zero-corridor system
The ‘zero-corridor’ system can be thought of as a further
variant of the corridor system where both the lending and
Interest rate corridors
Interest rate corridors consist of a rate at which the central
bank will lend reserves to commercial banks and a rate at
which it will take deposits from them.  Any such system will
help to prevent rates in the interbank market from straying
outside the corridor.  How market rates are determined 
within the corridor depends on factors such as whether or not
banks are required to hold reserves, and whether and how
reserves are remunerated.  The combination of the corridor
with these other factors gives rise to a variety of different
corridor systems, examples of which are discussed further in
this box. 
In some systems, including in the euro area, banks are each
required to hold a certain quantity of reserves.  In the 
United Kingdom, prior to the MPC’s decision to purchase
assets financed by reserves creation, banks were invited to set
their own explicit reserves target each month.  In both cases,
the central bank’s task in implementing monetary policy is to
supply a quantity of reserves in line with the requirements or
target, so that the market rate lies at the centre of the corridor
with no tendency to move towards one or other edge. 
If banks are required to meet their reserves requirements or
targets precisely, market interest rates will be very sensitive to
variations in the supply of reserves around those requirements
or targets.  That is because small variations in supply can move
banks from using the lending facility into using the deposit
facility or vice versa.  In that case, the demand curve in Chart 1
would be steep in this area.  But if requirements or targets do
not have to be met so precisely, market rates should be less
sensitive.  For example, in the United Kingdom, banks suffered
no penalties so long as their reserves were, on average over 
the month, within a certain range around their targets.
Consequently, within the target range, the demand curve in
Chart 1 was relatively flat.
Both the tolerance and the averaging process contribute to the
objective.  If banks can vary their reserves holdings from day to
day, that reduces the probability that they will have to use
central bank facilities to borrow or deposit at rates at the top
or bottom of the corridor.  That in turn helps to stabilise
market interest rates.  The central bank’s task is also made
easier in that it needs to forecast and supply the necessary
quantity of reserves only on average over the period.  And it
has the opportunity to adjust supply during the period.
Other corridor systems are rather different.  In Australia and
Canada, for example, there are no reserves requirements or
formal targets.  All reserves are remunerated at the rate at the
bottom of the corridor (below the policy rate and below
market rates).  Banks therefore, in practice, target quite low
levels of reserves.  Their demand depends mainly on a
comparison of the benefits from holding some reserves for use
in the payment system against the cost of their low
remuneration rate.  The central bank’s task is to supply its
estimate of the small amount of reserves that will enable the
market to clear at the target rate.  With the demand for
reserves less easy to observe in such systems, central banks are
more reliant on information from movements in the market
rate itself.  And with only a low level of reserves available to
buffer liquidity shocks from day to day, the central bank needs
to regularly adjust the supply of reserves — possibly almost
every day as, for example, in Australia — in order to avoid
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deposit rates are the same as the policy rate so that the whole
interest rate corridor is collapsed to the policy rate.  
Since no bank would transact at a less favourable interest rate
in the interbank market than it could obtain at the central
bank, overnight interbank interest rates — to the extent that
interbank trading would still take place under such a system —
would thus converge to the policy rate. 
Under this system OMOs are not required.  Instead, the
standing facilities play the central role in supplying and
absorbing reserves at the policy rate.  With the supply of
reserves seamlessly adjusting to demand, the zero-corridor
system should provide the most robust interest rate control in
the face of changes to the demand for reserves or disruption to
the interbank money market.  However, with the banking
system relying more heavily on transacting with the central
bank than it does under the corridor or floor system, the 
zero-corridor system is also more susceptible to shortages of
eligible collateral, which would impinge on the reliable
implementation of monetary policy.
A drawback of the zero-corridor system is that it conflates
monetary policy implementation and the provision of liquidity
insurance.  In the corridor and floor systems, usage of the
lending facility is exceptional;  in the zero-corridor system, by
contrast, it is the norm.  The lending facility is therefore
delivering two objectives, making it harder for the central bank
to distinguish between banks that are using it to manage their
day-to-day liquidity buffers and those that have experienced a
more fundamental liquidity or even solvency shock.
As with the two other systems, the zero-corridor system can
be operated in a manner that protects the integrity of the
central bank’s balance sheet by appropriate restrictions on
collateral and the setting of haircuts.  However, a distinctive
feature of a zero-corridor system is that, by regularly offering
to borrow and lend overnight on demand, the central bank
relinquishes day-to-day control over the size (and potentially
the composition) of its balance sheet.
Impact on the interbank money market
The interbank money market is the market in which banks
borrow and lend short-term funds between each other.  Since
these transactions have ultimately to be settled via banks’
reserves accounts, the interbank money market is also the
market for reserves.  It follows that banks’ incentives to trade
in the interbank market are affected by the terms on which
reserves are available from the central bank.  
Of the three operating systems described above, it is the
corridor system that provides the strongest incentive to trade
in the interbank market.  If payment flows leave one bank with
a surplus of reserves and another with a shortage of reserves,
they have an incentive to trade with each other at a rate
within the corridor.  If, instead, they were to make use of the
central bank’s standing facilities, the bank that is short of
reserves would have to pay the less favourable central bank
lending rate (at the top of the corridor), while the bank with a
surplus would receive only the central bank deposit rate (at the
bottom of the corridor).  There is less incentive to trade in a
floor system, where banks generally have a much larger buffer
of reserves with which to absorb payment shocks.  And the 
zero-corridor system provides little or no incentive to trade in
the interbank market, since banks can borrow (on security) any
amount from the central bank at the policy rate and can
deposit any amount at the same rate.(1)
The interbank market forms the centre of a wider money
market in which non-bank financial institutions and some 
non-financial companies participate.  Without a liquid
overnight interbank market and transparent pricing, there is a
risk that this wider market would not function efficiently.
The next section briefly describes the operating framework the
Bank employed prior to the financial crisis, and discusses how
the lessons learned during the past three years have influenced
its plans for the future development of the SMF.
The sterling monetary framework since 2006
The Bank reformed its operational framework in May 2006 to
improve its implementation of monetary policy.(2) The new
framework was comprised of a corridor system in which banks
set their own reserves targets every month.  Reserves balances
that on average over the month fell within a relatively narrow
range around those targets were remunerated at Bank Rate.
Outside this range, surplus reserves, which had been moved to
the deposit facility, were remunerated at the lower deposit
rate, while banks with insufficient reserves had to borrow
those reserves at the higher lending rate to avoid a penalty.  
The objective of the reforms was to ensure that monetary
policy would be implemented reliably, ie there would be a
close and stable relationship between overnight market rates
and Bank Rate.  It was designed also to offer a flexible
structure for banking system liquidity management and to
foster a competitive and fair money market.  But it involved
only limited liquidity insurance, provided in the course of
implementing monetary policy.  In particular, the Bank only
lent against a narrow range of high-quality, liquid, collateral.  
Prior to the onset of the financial crisis in mid-2007, the
reserves averaging corridor system met its monetary policy
(1) Under the zero-corridor system, the incentives to trade in the interbank market would
depend on the collateral policies of the central bank.  If the central bank only lends
against a narrow range of collateral at the policy rate, banks may have an incentive to
trade with each other using other types of collateral.  
(2) For a detailed description of the SMF, see Bank of England (2008a,b), Clews (2005)
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objective effectively.  Short-term money market interest rates,
such as secured and unsecured overnight interest rates, were
generally close to Bank Rate and less volatile than under the
Bank’s previous operational framework (Chart 2).  
From the summer of 2007, however, when interbank markets
began to seize up amid concerns about banks’ solvency and
liquidity, the Bank, along with many other central banks, had
to adapt its operations to provide large-scale liquidity support
to the banking system.  Over that period, there was a greater
divergence between short-term market interest rates and 
Bank Rate than had previously been the case.(1)
Subsequently, the SMF underwent a further major change
when the Bank suspended the corridor system of voluntary
reserves in March 2009, following the MPC’s decision to
purchase assets financed through the creation of central bank
reserves (commonly known as ‘quantitative easing’).  In
principle, banks could have continued to set monthly targets
and — to the extent that the MPC’s asset purchases supplied
reserves in excess of these targets — the Bank could have
borrowed them back through OMOs.  The Bank judged it
better not to borrow reserves in increasingly large quantities at
the same time as the purchase programme grew.  Instead,
monetary policy has since been implemented through a floor
system, with the level of reserves initially being increased
exactly in line with asset purchases.(2) Over this period,
overnight market rates have been close to Bank Rate 
(Chart 2).
The experience of the financial crisis has influenced the Bank’s
thinking about the operation of the SMF in a number of ways.
In particular, the Bank found that it could better achieve its
two main objectives if it could more clearly separate
operations aimed at implementing monetary policy decisions
from those aimed at providing liquidity insurance.  The crisis
also highlighted that lending facilities can become ineffective
if banks are unwilling to use them for fear of the reputational
damage that might occur.  As a result, the Bank now sees merit
in having a framework that allows it to supply reserves to the
banking system through a variety of channels.  This provides
greater robustness to unexpected events.  Finally, the Bank
found that, during times of great uncertainty, the information
it gained about banks’ liquidity through its money market
operations became particularly valuable.  
The remainder of this section describes in more detail how
these lessons have influenced the development of the SMF.
Separation between objectives
The Bank’s collateral policy plays an important role in the
separation between monetary policy implementation and the
provision of liquidity insurance.  Operations aimed at
implementing monetary policy decisions only provide reserves
against a narrow range of high-quality collateral that is reliably
liquid in private markets (predominantly debt securities of
highly rated governments).  Such operations are unlikely to
alter the risk characteristics of banks’ balance sheets to such a
degree as to prompt any behavioural changes.  By contrast, the
Bank stands ready to provide liquidity insurance against a
broader range of less liquid assets, such as asset-backed
securities.  When providing such liquidity insurance, the Bank
charges higher fees to provide incentives for banks to manage
their liquidity prudently.  
Reflecting this separation between monetary policy
implementation and the provision of liquidity insurance, the
Bank split its single bilateral lending facility into two separate
facilities in 2008.  The first, aimed predominantly at monetary
policy implementation, is the Operational Lending Facility.  In
this facility, banks may borrow reserves overnight on demand
against a narrow range of collateral at a spread of 25 basis
points over Bank Rate.  Its use is limited to situations where
banks suffer frictional, temporary, payment difficulties (say
because of a temporary problem with the payments
infrastructure) or where overnight market rates have become
unexpectedly volatile.
The second facility, aimed more exclusively at liquidity
insurance, is the Discount Window Facility (DWF).  In the DWF,
banks can borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral and
for a longer period.  But they have to pay higher fees that
reflect the type of collateral and the size of the drawing
relative to the size of the borrowing bank.  Borrowers can then
use the gilts in the secured money market to obtain reserves.
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Chart 2 Spread to Bank Rate of sterling overnight
interest rates
Sources:  BrokerTec, Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(b) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(c) Introduction of reserves averaging corridor system.
(d) Start of financial crisis.
(e) Failure of Lehman Brothers.
(f) Start of quantitative easing.
(1) See Cross, Fisher and Weeken (2010) for a more detailed description of how the SMF
evolved during the crisis.
(2) The Bank accompanied the change with an announcement that all reserves would be
remunerated at Bank Rate.  Consequently, while the lending and deposit facilities
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Gilts are supplied rather than reserves, to ensure that liquidity
supplied for a longer term than overnight and at the borrowing
bank’s initiative (but subject to the Bank’s approval) does not
affect the liquidity of the banking system as a whole.  The DWF
thus provides an operational separation between the provision
of liquidity insurance and monetary policy implementation.
The Bank aims to exclude from its facilities any bank whose
solvency or viability is seriously in question.  These design
features of the DWF should help mitigate moral hazard and
also reduce any stigma that has in the past been associated
with the use of the Operational Lending Facility. 
The Bank also stands ready to operate two different types of
OMOs to supply reserves.  In its short-term OMOs, it offers to
lend reserves for a period of one week or less against a narrow
range of collateral.(1) Short-term OMOs are aimed to steer the
quantity of reserves to the amount necessary for the banking
system in aggregate to meet its targets and to ensure that
market rates remain close to Bank Rate.  In contrast, since
December 2007, long-term OMOs have been intended to
provide some liquidity insurance.  In these operations the Bank
offers to lend reserves for a longer period, including against a
broader range of collateral than it accepts in its short-term
OMOs.  But unlike with the DWF the quantity of liquidity
supplied is entirely controlled by the Bank.
Of course, the distinction between monetary policy
implementation and liquidity insurance is not categorical:
long-term OMOs create reserves and so contain an element of
monetary policy implementation, while the combination of
reserves accounts and the Operational Lending Facility
provides some degree of liquidity insurance.  Nevertheless, the
current arrangements serve to delineate the aims of the
different operations more than has been the case in the past.
Robustness
In principle, the Bank could provide liquidity insurance solely
via on-demand liquidity facilities like the DWF.  But the Bank
believes that there would be two main risks with relying solely
on a single facility.  First, during times of severe stress, there
may be heavy operational demands on the Bank were it to use
the DWF alone to supply a large amount of liquidity.  Second,
stigma provides an opposing risk.  By their very nature, liquidity
facilities, such as the DWF, are for use in exceptional
circumstances and are most likely to be used by banks that
need a large amount of liquidity that they would find difficult
to obtain in the private markets.  While the DWF is designed to
limit any stigma associated with its use, it may not do so
completely.  
The Bank’s long-term repo operations provide it with an
alternative means of providing liquidity insurance.  By offering
to transact with the banking system as a whole on the initiative
of the Bank, they are qualitatively different than facilities in
which individual banks have to approach the Bank.  They also
allow the Bank to supply a large amount of liquidity insurance
to the banking system in an operationally simple manner.
Information
In 2006, the combination of voluntary reserves targets and the
remuneration, at Bank Rate, of reserves balances that were in
line with those targets, was a departure from the mandatory
reserves requirements specified in many corridor systems.  By
inviting banks to reveal their demand for reserves every month,
the Bank gained useful information about banks’ liquidity
needs.  Under the current floor system this information is lost. 
More recently, the Bank has further reformed its long-term
OMOs.  It continues to offer to supply reserves against both a
narrow and a wider range of collateral.  However, whereas from
December 2007 the premium banks paid to obtain reserves
against wider collateral relative to narrow collateral was
initially fixed, since June 2010 it has been variable.  And the
amount of reserves supplied against each collateral range now
depends on the level of the premium.  During times of
heightened stress, banks will be willing to pay a higher
premium for obtaining reserves against the broader range of
collateral that is less liquid in private markets.  The amount of
insurance provided is thus dependent on the value that banks
place on this insurance.(2) Moreover, through their bidding
behaviour, banks will reveal the value they place on this
insurance, thereby providing the Bank with useful information
about emerging liquidity stresses in the banking system.
The SMF in the future
The Bank will retain many of the innovations and new facilities
it introduced during the financial crisis.  In particular, the DWF
and the reformed long-term OMOs, together with the
associated collateral and access policies, now form an integral
part of the SMF.  
The Bank is also minded, in due course, to reinstate its version
of the corridor system in which banks set voluntary reserves
targets.  Overall, the Bank judges that — during normal times
— a corridor system in conjunction with the Bank’s collateral
and access policies will facilitate the reliable implementation of
monetary policy, while also providing appropriately limited
liquidity insurance.  It avoids the risk that could be associated
with the oversupply of reserves under a permanent floor
system and facilitates some separation between monetary
policy implementation and the provision of liquidity insurance.
Moreover, the Bank sees it as an advantage of the corridor
system that it allows the interbank market to continue in
being.(3)
(1) With the Bank’s version of the corridor system suspended, the Bank currently does not
operate short-term OMOs.  
(2) The Bank’s new long-term repo operations are described in more detail on 
pages 90–91 of the 2010 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin. 
(3) The interbank market provides banks with greater flexibility in managing their
liquidity, although, there can be instances where excessive interbank trading acts as a
source of instability.  300 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
In extreme circumstances, the Bank stands ready to make
further adjustments to its operating framework, to best meet
its objectives at the time.  The floor system currently in
operation is an example of such an adaptation.  
Conclusions
The design of an operating framework has implications for how
the central bank discharges its objectives with respect to
monetary policy implementation and financial stability.  The
former rests on meeting the banking system’s demand for
reserves, while the latter requires managing the provision of
liquidity insurance to mitigate moral hazard.
The choice of operating system, access rules and collateral
policies that constitute a central bank’s operating framework
will jointly determine how monetary policy is implemented
and liquidity insurance is provided and how any potential
tensions between them are managed.  
The experience of the financial crisis has influenced the Bank’s
thinking about the design of its operating framework.  As a
result, the Bank has adopted an operating framework that
more clearly separates monetary policy implementation and
the provision of liquidity insurance, that allows it to supply
reserves through a variety of channels and that, through its
operations, provides the Bank with information about the
liquidity needs of the banking system.  For the reasons 
outlined above, the Bank is minded, in due course, to reinstate
its version of the corridor system that was suspended in 
March 2009.  But central banks’ operating frameworks are not
static and the Bank’s operating framework will continue to
evolve in light of experience and developments in financial
markets.  Research and analysis The Bank’s money market framework 301
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